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Foreword
1 June of 1991, Dr. Kunio Suyama, Presi-
dent of OYO Corporation, and Dr. Brian
Tucker agreed to a two-and-a-half-year part-
nership to explore prospects for creating a
nonprofit organization dedicated to reduc-
ing urban earthquake risk in developing
countries. In February of 1992, Tucker met
with Dr. Jean-Luc Chatelain of ORSTOM to
discuss a suitable city in which to conduct a
pilot project for this organization. Chatelain
recommended Quito, Ecuador, for several
reasons.
Most important, Quito has a significant
earthquake risk, experiencing over the past
250 years several earthquakes with ground
shaking intensities so strong that standing
becomes difficult. AlI of these events oc-
curred when Quito was significantly less
populated and developed than it is today.
Quito was also recommended because
of the reputation of its earth scientists and
civil engineers at the Escuela Politécnica
Nacional, and the related research that
ORSTOM had been conducting in Ecuador
for several years. In May of 1992, Chatelain
and Tucker went to Quito to discuss the idea
of a collaborative project with Professor
Hugo Yepes, chief seismologist at the
Instituto Geofisico of the Escuela Politécnica
Nacional. Yepes agreed with the need for
such a project in Quito and introduced
Tucker to government and business leaders
to gather community support. In July of
1992, Tucker met the city's mayor, Jamil
Mahuad Witt, who lent his support. In
September of 1992, the mayor convened a
group of Ecuadorian and international gov-
ernment, business, and scientific leaders to
provide project oversight, and work began.
CA summary of the organization, chronol-
ogy, and accomplishments of the project is
in the Appendices).
Major financial and technical support
for this project was provided by OYO Cor-
iv
poration, the Escuela Politécnica Nacional,
the Municipio de Quito, and ORSTOM.
Supplementary funding was provided by
Compaiieros de las Américas and the Natu-
raI Science and Engineering Research Coun-
cil of Canada.
The Ecuadorian and international ad-
visors and consultants listed at the begin-
ning of this report generously contributed
their time and energy. Their expertise distin-
guishes this project. The encouragement of
the following organizations is also appreci-
ated: the International Association of Earth-
quake Engineering and its World Seismic
Safety Initiative; the International Associa-
tion of Seismology and Physics of the Earth's
Interior and its committee on the International
Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction
(lDNDR); the International Society of Soil
Mechanics and Foundation Engineering; the
Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief
Coordinator; the United Nations Educational,
Scientific, and Cultural Organization; and
the Secretariat ofthe United Nations IDNDR.
This project was a cooperative venture
involving more than a hundred participants
from many countries and areas of expertise,
who came together to make the evaluations
and recommendations presented here. There
is one individual, however, whose generos-
ity and vision made this cooperation pos-
sible. When initially approached for financial
support, he asked insightful questions about
the project's purpose, methods, and partici-
pants, and in so doing, improved its design.
Only after concluding that the project's goal
was worthwhile and the method practical
did he ask about cost. The estimate pro-
vided seemed to him unrealistic, so he
increased it. Then, nine months after being
initially approached, he agreed to provide
support, stepped back, and let the work begin.
He died before the project was com-
plete. This report is dedicated to him, Dr.
Kunio Suyama.
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Introduction
QUito, Ecuador's capital city, was last
damaged by an earthquake on March 6,
1987. While that earthquake resulted in
approximately 1,000 deaths and $700 mil-
lion of property loss outside Quito, damage
and injuries within the city were minor. This
is the strongest earthquake that current
residems of Quito have experienced.
In the previous 250 years, however,
Quito has been shaken by many stronger
earthquakes, including four that produced
ground shaking so strong that it was difficult
for residents to stand. These four earth-
quakes occurred in 1755, 1797, 1859, and
1868, when Quito was significamly smaller
in population and Iess developed than to-
day. In 1868, Quito was home to only 45,000
people, and its population was confined to
approximately 4 square km. Since then,
Quito has grown more than 25 times in
population (to 1.2 million residents), and
roughly 70 times in area (Figures 1 and 2).
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Figure 1. Population growth and major
historicalearthquakes in Quito.
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Quito's Plaza de Santo Domingo, c. 1930.
Efforts to accommodate this growth
have resulted in a proliferation of poorly
constructed buildings and the development
of hazardous areas. Earthquake-resistant
design and construction are uncommon, as
Quito's building code is not strictly enforced
and is otherwise inadequate. Structures
have been built on unstable sites, such as
quebradas (ravines) fil1ed with loose soil.
Steep hiUsides, previously uninhabited, are
now heavily populated (see map insert).
Because of these recent, dramatic
changes, past disasters cannot be used to
assess the impact of the next destructive
earthquake on modern Quito. A large earth-
quake today will affect not only a much
larger urban population, but also completely
different types of urban construction, such
as mid- and high-rise buildings.
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The purpose of the Quito Earthquake
llisk Management Project was to provide
direction to government officials, business
leaders, and the general public in reducing
damage and injury in the next major earth-
quake. To do this, three objectives were
adopted:
• Improve the understanding of Quito's
earthquake hazard;
• Raise the awareness of the earthquake
risk both within Ecuador and internation-
ally; and
• Design self-sustaining programs for man-
aging earthquake risk.
To achieve these objectives, the project
was divided into three phases. In the first
phase, future earthquakes and their effects
on Quito were analyzed. In the second, the
impact on lite in Quito during the month
following one of these earthquakes was
described in vivid, nontechnical terms. Fi-
nally, based on the first two phases of the
project, recommendations for managing
Quito's earthquake risk were formulated by
a group of Ecuadorian and international
specialists. This report provides an over-
view of these three phases.
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Figure 2. Historicalgrowth ofQuito.
A view ofmodern Quito, looking northwest to thejlanks ofMount
Pichincha.
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Future Earthquakes and
Their Effects on Quito
Figure 3. Location ofthe potential coastal (A), inland
(B), and local (C) earthquakes with respect to Quito.
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The intensity of ground shaking during
an earthquake depends on local ground
conditions. For example, when aIl other
factors are equal, soft soils shake more than
do stiff soils. In order to account for such
effects, Quito was divided into zones based
on local ground conditions. The ground
shaking intensity of each zone was calculated
Determlning the Earthquake Threat
The amount of shaking, or "ground
shaking intensity," that Quito will experi-
ence during an earthquake depends prima-
rily on three factors: the strength of the
earthquake (magnitude), its distance from
Quito, and Quito's ground conditions.
Geologists and seismologists attempted
to determine the magnitude and location of
earthquakes that would likely damage Quito
in the future. They analyzed Ecuador's faults
and earthquake records dating back to the
16th century. Three earthquakes, represent-
ing the range of possible magnitudes and
distances, were selected for detailed assess-
ment (Figure 3):
• A coastal (subduction zone) earthquake
of magnitude 8.4 located 200 km west of
Quito;
• An inland earthquake of magnitude 7.3
located 80 km east of Quito; and
• A local earthquake of magnitude 6.5
located 25 km north of Quito.
1 the first phase of this project, an inter-
national, interdisciplinary team of more
than 40 seismologists, geologists, soils engi-
neers, structural engineers, and city plan-
ners from Ecuador, Canada, France, )apan,
and the United States estimated the magni-
tudes and locations of future earthquakes
likely to affect Quito, the level of ground
shaking that these earthquakes would cre-
ate, and the damage to Quito's buildings
and infrastructure.
3
The Quito Earthquake Risk Management Project
for each of the three potential earthquakes
(Figures 4, 5, and 6).
The effect of magnitude, location, and
local ground conditions on ground shaking
intensity is apparent in these figures. Al-
though the magnitude 8.4 coastal earth-
quake wou Id release over 30 times more
energy than the magnitude 7.3 inland earth-
quake, it would produce Jess ground shak-
ing in Quito as it is 120 km farther away.
Although the local earthquake has the small-
est magnitude, it would create the strongest
ground shaking in Quito as it occurs so
close (25 km from downtown). Its proximity
to northern Quito and the characteristics of
soft northern soils may result in severe,
"MSK intensity 8-" shaking in the north. The
MSK scaJe is one of several ground shaking
N
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Figure 4. Ground shaking intensities in Quito
resultingfrom the coastal earthquake. Black lines
delineate soil zones.
Figure 5. Ground shaking intensities in Quito
resultingfrom the inland earthquake.
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Figure 6. Ground shaking intensities in Quito
resultingjrom the local earthquake.
intensity scales used by earth scientists and
engineers to relate ground shaking to the
effects that it has on people, buildings, and
nature. During MSK 8- ground shaking,
many people have difficulty standing, and
the earthquake is dearly felt by people
driving. In sorne cases, tree branches are
sheared by the shaking, and heavy furniture
moves and sometimes overturns. Cracks
form in walls and chimneys of concrete
Ssvsrity of shaking
Assessing Earthquake Damage
Once ground shaking intensity
for a particular potential earthquake
has been estimated, it is possible to
estimate damage to buildings and in-
frastructure. To do so, it is necessary
to inventory the types of structures;
analyze how each type of structure
responds to various levels of ground
shaking; and finally, estimate damage
to each type of structure based on the
expected ground shaking, earth-
quake-induced landslides, soil settle-
ment, ground surface rupture, and
liquefaction.
The behavior of structures during
earthquakes depends not only on the
amount of ground shaking, but also on
the age, material, design, construction
quality, and dimensions of the struc-
ture. For example, the behavior of a
muIti-story building made of concrete
reinforced with steel bars ("reinforced
concrete") is very different than that of
a one-story building made of adobe.
For this reason, it was necessary to
determine the prevalent categories of
buildings in Quito. Buildings were
structures. In brick buildings, large cracks
form in walls, and chimneys collapse. Parts
of and, in sorne cases, entire adobe build-
ings collapse. Shaking would be slightly less
downtown and even less in the south, but
still strong enough to produce moderate
damage in poorly constructed buildings.
Other earthquakes ofdifferent strengths
and locations could occur and would pro-
duce different patterns of ground shaking
than depicted here. For example, an
earthquake occurring on one of the
nearby fauIts to the south of Quito
would result in greater shaking in the
south than in the north and, possibly,
greater levels of shaking than any de-
picted here.
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inventoried and c1assified into 15 types
according to materials and design. For sim-
plicity, these buildings have been grouped
into five categories: adobe, masonry (virtu-
ally aH ofwhich, in Quito, are unreinforced),
seLf-built (primarily homes constructed by
the owner without engineering consider-
ations), steel, and reinforced concrete (Fig-
ure 7 and map insert).
Damage to these buildings, based on
ground shaking from each of the three
potential earthquakes, was estimated lIsing
data sets developed in California and cali-
brated with data from Central and South
America to apply to the buildings in Quito.
Damage to infrastructure, including water
and power supply systems, sewers, and
roads in Quito, was also estimated using
similar methods.
The potential for damage due to effects
other than ground shaking was also evalu-
ated. Damage from landslides, a major
N
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Figure 7. Distribution ofbuilding categories in Quito
(see also map insert).
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Figure 8. Building damage resultingfrom the
potentiallocal earthquake (see also map insert).
The Quito Earthquake Risk Management Project
Figure 9. Damage to roads
resultingfrom thepotential
local earthquake.
Figure Il. Damage to the
power network resultingfrom
thepotentiallocal earthquake.
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Figure 12. Damage to sewers
resultingfrom thepotential
local earthquake.
Figure 10. Damage to the water
supply system resultingfrom
thepotentiallocal earthquake.
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hazard both to structures on top
of the landslide mass as well as
those below it, and from seulement
of the soils in filled quebradas and
over sewer pipes, over which
many buildings have been con-
structed, was analyzed. (Details are
presented in The Quito, Ecuador,
Earthquake Risk Management
Project: A Compilation ofMeth0 ds,
Data, and Findings.) Because of
the distance of the three potential
earthquakes from the city, surface
rupture due to faulting will not
occur. "Soilliquefaction," a condi-
tion in which certain soils are tem-
porarily changed from a soUd to a
liquid state as a result of ground
shaking, is, based on available in-
formation, not expected to occur
as a result of these earthquakes.
Additional study, however, is
needed.
Of the three potential earth-
quakes scrutinized here, the local
earthquake would create the great-
est damage. The damage rate to
buildings from this earthquake is
illustrated in Figure 8 and the map
insert. "Damage rate" is the ratio of
the cost of earthquake damage to
the replacement cost of the build-
ing at current prices. Damage rates
are averaged through each zone.
For example, the same damage
rate may apply to a zone in which
aH buildings are uniformly dam-
aged and to one in which sorne are
slightly damaged and others com-
pletely destroyed.
The potentiallocal earthquake
wouId cause extensive damage to
neighborhoods in northern Quito,
where ground shaking is greatest
and where there are many vulner-
able self-built buildings. Structures
built on the hillsides surrounding
7
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Figure 13. Building damage resulting from the March
1987earthquake, based onfield observations. (Note
the much larger damage rate estimatedfor thepoten-
tiallocal earthquake in Figure 8).
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the city, many of which are also self-built,
would experience significant damage as
weil. High levels of damage would oceur in
the Centro Historico, the oldest part of the
city, primarily because of the preponder-
ance of adobe and unreinforced masonry
buildings. Reinforced concrete buildings
would suifer less damage for the same level
of shaking.
Damage to the roads, water system,
power network, and sewers resulting from
the potential local earthquake willlikely be
severe as weil (Figures 9, 10, 11, and 12).
A comparison of the damage from the
March 1987 earthquake (Figure 13), which
had a magnitude of 6.9 and occurred 80 km
east of Quito, with damage forecast for the
potential local earthquake (Figure 8), indi-
cates that the local earthquake would cause
significantly more damage. The performance
of buildings, infrastructure, and emergency
response agencies during the 1987 earth-
quake is not, therefore, a reliable indicator
of the consequences of Quito's future de-
structive earthquakes.
While the consequences of Quito's
next destructive earthquake cannot be fore-
cast, they are likely to cause extensive
damage to utilities, especially roads, sewers,
and water, power, and telephone systems;
damage to sorne reinforced concrete struc-
tures, inc1uding sorne new buildings; exten-
sive damage to self-built homes; and total
collapse of many self-built, adobe, and
unreinforced masonry buildings, and many
cultural monuments. The next section de-
scribes the possible impacts on daily life in
Quito during the month following such an
earthquake.
The Quito Earthquake Rjsk Management Project
A MonthinQuito Following
a Future Earthquake
The technical analysis of this project,
while providing detailed estimates of dam-
age from potential earthquakes, does not
communicate the impact of such disasters.
The purpose of the second phase of the
project was to describe life in Quito during
the month foUowing one of these earth-
quakes. This description can help govern-
ment officiaIs, emergency service planners,
business leaders, and the general public ta
visualize the consequences of a future major
earthquake, and provide the motivation and
understanding required to act.
The following description is based on
the technical analysis of the local earth-
quake and a vulnerability study of Quito's
city services, public buildings, and infra-
structure. The vulnerability study was per-
formed by interviewing officiaIs from 17
different city organizations, inc1uding sewer,
water, power, and transportation depart-
ments; Civil Defense; and fire and police
departments. The locations of critical facili-
ties referred to in the following pages are
shown in Figure 14 and the map insert.
View ofPlaza de la lndependencia, bordered lYy Ecuador's Presidential Palace (back-
ground) and City Hall (not pictured).
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CAUTION
Thejollowings cU ndes:ribespossibl impacts
of the potential ID tll earthquake in Quito. Other
ea1·thquakes 1?Of evaluated in this sludy wou/d pro-
duce difjerent consequences. 'lb!s is nota prediction
of Cl ;peciflc earf1.?quake, earthquake damage, or
consequ.ences. Tbi descrijJtion is int6nded onlyfi l'
use trI planning andprepQ1'edness exercises and in
"aising awareness of Quito's earthquake ,'isk. The
au.thors, advisors, andol/:)ercontrtbutorslo thi report
are not responsib/efor use beyond the e purpo e .
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18 La Vlcentina
aubstatlon
La Alameda Park
La Carollna Park
Central Telephone
Bulldin,
4 Civil Defenoe Office
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7 Via Interoceanlca
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Figure 14. Selected Quito landmarks (see also map imerl).
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The Earthquake Strikes
It isjust after 9:00 P.M. An afternoon of
heavy rain has soaked the city; the streets are
still wet. Residents of Quito are relaxing with
family and friends, having dinner, watching
television, or sitting and talking. Older chil-
dren are studying for the next day of school
while the younger ones are asleep in bed.
Suddenly there is a slight jolt, then
heavier shaking. Dishes quiver on dinner
tables, and windows rattle in their casings.
The city trembles as the ground shakes vio-
lently. People are initially confused by the
commotion, but then realize that Quito is
experiencing a major earthquake.
Some people lose their balance; others
are thrown to the floor. Cabinet doors swing
open, ejecting pots, pans, and dishes onto
the floor in a terrible din. Pets run about,
frightened. Pictures, lamps, and televisions
fall to the floor, causing injury to some people
as they try to run from their homes to escape
danger. Some doors get stuck in their frames,
trapping people inside.
Northern Quito experiences the stron-
gest shaking because of its proximity to the
earthquake source. The shaking is so strong
that it becomes difficult to stand and nearly
impossible to walk. Many bookcases, refrig-
erators, stoves, and other heavy objects over-
turn, pinningorcrushingsome people beneath
them. Self-built homes are devastated. Cracks
form in walls of many reinforced concrete
homes, severely damaging some.
Shaking in the Centro Historico is not as
severe as in the north, but is still very strong.
The abundance of the vulnerable adobe and
unreinforced masonry buildings leaves the
area heavily damaged. Some adobe struc-
tures collapse, especially those already dam-
aged in past earthquakes and not properly
repaired, trapping and killing those inside.
Some unreinforced masonry church facades,
cupolas, interior walls, and towers crack and
collapse. Heavy, tile roofs collapse into homes.
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Narrow streets become clogged with rubble;
frantic people search in the wreckage for
loved ones.
Modern buildings between the Centro
Historico and the airport escape serious dam-
age. Structures in the vicinity of the airport,
however, suffer moderate to severe damage,
as do self-built structures on the eastern and
western slopes of the southern part of the
city. In southern Quito, the shaking is the
least intense, but still strong enough to crack
brick and cement block walls and destroy
chimneys. Practically ail unreinforced masonry
school buildings in Quito, and several rein-
forced concrete school buildings with short
columns, collapse or are badly damaged.
Adobe buildings in the Centro Historico.
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Landslides block Via Oriental and Via
Occidental, especially in lanes next to cut
slopes. Northern access to the city is inter-
rupted by landslides on Panamericana Norte,
the road to the Mitad dei Mundo, and the road
through Calacali to the coast. Several large
landslides and rocks fall on the Tabacundo
Highway and Via Interoceanica, making them
impassable. A bridge on the Panamericana
Norte is heavily damaged, rendering it, too,
unusable. Several secondary streets in north-
ern Quito suffercracking. Northwestern neigh-
borhoods such as Jaime Roldos, Pisuli, and
Comite dei Pueblo 2 become isolated. Some
roads in the northeast are partially blocked;
slope failure at the Zambiza garbage dump
cuts the only access to that area. Several
main north-south avenues are blocked by
damaged overpasses. Some motorists, un-
able to proceed, abandon their cars in the
middle of the street. More than a hundred
obstructions in the roads of Quito make tran-
sit within the city and between northern, cen-
trai, and southern Quito almost impossible.
Some ofQuito 's many overpasses.
The airport suffers only minor damage
and remains operational, but is difficult to
access, especially from the south. Police
stations and the Civil Defense building suffer
localized damage; fire stations suffer more
severe damage. In some cases, emergency
12
Slopes susceptible to landslides along Via
Occidental.
response equipment is damaged or trapped,
thwarting timely response. Medicines in hos-
pitals and clinics fall from shelves and spill
onto the floor, and medical equipment is
severely damaged. Some hospital staff and
patients are injured by falling equipment. Two
unreinforced masonry hospitals, and older
unreinforced masonry wings of newer hospi-
tais, suffer heavy damage and become inoper-
able. Many factories and warehouses made of
steel are damaged when poorly anchored
masonrywallscollapse. Some industrial build-
ings suffer heavy damage and a few collapse,
in some cases releasing hazardous materials.
Water pipes throughout Quito break, es-
pecially at their rigid joints and in places
where they cross filled quebradas. Landslides
block the open canal that brings drinking
water to the Puengasi water treatment plant.
Some main sewer collectors-in particular,
those located on the western slopes of the
city-rupture, damagingbuildings and streets
above. Landslides along the Machangara River
block sewage outlets. Structural damage to
the central telephone building results in par-
tial loss of telephone communication within
Quito and to the outside world. Power poles
fall throughout the city, and more than 500
transformers are damaged. Several distribu-
tion substations and transmission cables,
especially those in the northern part of the
city, are seriously damaged, plunging most of
Fire station.
the city into darkness. FortYseconds after the
start of the earthquake, the shaking stops.
One Hour Later
One hour after the earthquake struck,
uninjured citizens are removing rubble by hand
and with makeshift tools to free victims from
underneath collapsed buildings, despite fear
of aftershocks. People try to locate family
members and apply first aid, with only the
light from car headlights. Rescue of those
trapped underneath collapsed buildings is
hampered by darkness. The injured start to
make their own way toward hospitals and
private clinics. Because of fear of aftershocks
and the unknown structural condition of their
homes, many people who are uninjured and
have no missing family members head toward
open areas such as La Carolina, El Ejido, La
Alameda, and Fundeporte parks. A few seek
refuge in undamaged churches and convents,
despite the danger of aftershocks. Some,
taking advantage of the destruction and con-
fusion, loot unprotected homes and businesses.
ln several older homes, electrical wiring
short-circuits, and fire rapidly consumes old,
dry wood. Residents extinguish some fires;
thick adobe walls impede other fires from
spreading widely. The fire department cannot
attend to most fires because of poor commu-
nication, blocked roads, heavy traffic, lack of
personnel, and lack of water-many water
pipes have ruptured, cutting off supply, and
many fire hydrants were out of service even
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before the earthquake. The darkness of night
is punctuated by scattered flames.
The few operating commercial radio sta-
tions broadcast information to the public. The
broadcasters have limited knowledge of earth-
quake disaster recovery, and incite confusion
and panic with erroneous information, includ-
ing false rumors that a larger earthquake will
come in the next few days, that the Pichincha
volcano is going to erupt, and that high gov-
ernment officiais died in the earthquake.
Hospital hallways are crowded with pa-
tients, staff, and fallen equipment. Doctors
and nurses attempt to check the safety of
previously admitted patients while adminis-
tering first aid to new arrivais. In the southern
part of the city, damage is less severe and
fewer people are injured. Access to medical
One ofQuito 's more modern hospitals.
care is limited, however, because there is
only one major hospital in that area.
As there are no automatic shutoffvalves
within the water supply system, large quanti-
ties of water are lost. Quito's water supply is
eut off. Water and sewage flood the lower
parts of the city and damage some streets.
Portions of the telephone system in operation
are saturated by calls from people trying to
reach relatives, friends, hospitals, and other
public services.
No statement about the severity of earth-
quake damage has been made by government
officiais, as they are still gathering information.
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Aftershocks come frequently, threatening dam-
aged structures with further collapse. People
of Quito wait in anguish for dawn.
The First Day
During the first day after the earthquake,
citizens realize that roads are blocked, and
hence help may not come from rescue organi-
zations in the near future; they begin to orga-
nize groups to search buildings for the injured
and dead. Rescue operations are hampered
by a shortage of heavy equipment to move
rubble.
Since the city has no official agency or
plan to inspect and evaluate the safety of
buildings, several professionals volunteer to
determine the amount of damage; no one,
however, is authorized to make decisions on
the further use of the buildings. Some resi-
dents cautiously reenter damaged buildings
to search for missing persons or retrieve
personal belongings; most, however, do not
for fear of aftershocks, and will spend ensu-
ing nights outdoors in the cold weather until
temporary shelter can be found. A light rain
worsens their situation.
Looting continues in unprotected shops
and homes. Businesses and banks are not
open; people become frustrated and angry as
they try unsuccessfully to withdraw money
from automatic teller machines for their im-
mediate needs.
With the help of radio amateurs, emer-
gency response agencies organize rescue
units, focusing attention on the devastated
northern areas and the Centro Historico. Civil
Defense officiais are able to broadcast gen-
eral instructions to the population.
Several roads cave into underlying sew-
ers and quebradas. The city attempts to 10-
cate heavy equipment to open blocked and
damaged roads. Driving throughout the city is
nearly impossible. Within neighborhoods,
public transportation is nonexistent with the
exception of taxis, which charge many times
more than standard rates. Because of dam-
age to the power supply system, traffic lights
are out of service, resulting in confusion and
increased traffic congestion. Broken sewers
flood many vital underpasses.
Relief doctors and nurses cannot reach
the hospitals because of road conditions and
personal and family injuries, and hospital
staffs become fatigued. Many patients with
minor injuries are asked to leave in order to
free space for the more seriously injured.
Medical care is particularly difficult in hospi-
tais without reserve water supplies and backup
electrical generators. Undamaged public
schools and military quarters are transformed
into makeshift emergency health centers to
accommodate the large number of injured.
The city's iO-hour water reserve is ex-
hausted. The only water available in the most
affected areas is that remaining in household
water tanks. In some areas, available water is
polluted by sewage. EMAP-Q personnel begin
manually shutting off functioning water ser-
vice for inspection and to prevent further
water loss from damaged pipes. Officiais real-
Ize that in the coming week water will need to
Traffie in the Centro Historieo.
be trucked in from neighboring regions. More
than three-quarters of the city still is without
power; damage to several subnetworks and
system overload severely restrict telephone
communication. Because of a lack of earth-
quake preparedness plans, utility repairs are
slow and poorly coordinated.
The President of Ecuador declares Quito
a disaster area and proclaims a state of
emergency. The army is mobilized to participate
in emergency rescue and disaster recovery.
Two Days Later
Two days after the earthquake, thou-
sands of people are homeless; makeshift
shelters are not able to accommodate them.
Response workers are still attempting to res-
eue missing persons from beneath the rubble
of collapsed buildings. A strong aftershock
heightens anxiety and keeps most from re-
turning to their homes. The aftershock causes
the collapse of a few buildings damaged in the
main earthquake, injuring or killing those tak-
ing refuge inside. Nonetheless, a few sleep in
their damaged homes or on the street nearby
to guard against looters, and some seek
divine protection in churches. Many sleep in
the parks, risking exposure and sickness
from the rain and cold. Some with relatives,
friends, or homes in other provinces leave the
city, depriving Quito of badly needed emer-
gency response and recovery professionals.
There is an increasing demand for food
and medicine, but most stores and pharma-
cies remain closed; some vendors and store
owners greatly increase the priee of food,
medicine, and equipment. In poor neighbor-
hoods in northern Quito and in the Centro
Historico, residents lacking food supplies,
especiallythose whose homes were destroyed,
are tired and thirsty. Water is being distrib-
uted by the city's six tank trucks because of
the large number of ruptured water pipes.
There are reports that some private tankers
are charging many times the normal priee for
water. Some citizens, without access to fuel
for use in boiling water, become ill after
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Puengasi water treatmentplant.
consuming water contaminated by sewage.
There is no garbage collection, and garbage
accumulates on the streets.
Civil Defense broadcasts increasingly
more useful and specifie information. The
official estimates of casualties and economic
losses grow as more information becomes
available. The media continues to fuel ru mors
that, combined with frequent aftershocks,
further distress the population.
Some roads are still blocked, limiting
delivery of relief supplies. Government work-
ers begin to clear Via Occidental and Via
Oriental of debris, as these highways are vital
for the response and recovery of the city. A
few supplies begin to arrive at the airport, but
still there is limited access for pickup and
delivery. Supplies also begin to arrive at
Latacunga airport, 80 km south of Quito,
although there is difficulty in distributing them
to the more damaged areas of Quito.
Most of the injured have received some
medical attention. Lack of emergency medical
equipment, medicines, power, clean water,
and prompt treatment in public hospitals re-
sults in poor medical attention. Some people
die from injuries that under normal circum-
stances wou Id be nonfatal. Many of the in-
jured are taken to small health centers and
Red Cross first aid centers. The death toll
increases. As the morgues are full and not
readily accessible, dead bodies line hospital
hallways prior to identification and burial.
Health officiais make plans to create mass
graves.
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Telecommunications center.
Most equipment and supplies for major
utility repairs are unavailable due to short-
ages and inaccessibility. Sewage and rain
flood many utilitytunnels, damage roads, and
make repairs cumbersome and unpleasant.
At the central communications building, at-
tempts to make equipment repairs and rees-
tablish telephone service fail, as the staff is
unwilling to enter the building for fear of
aftershocks; phone service is consequently
unreliable. While EMETEL makes telephone
service available to government and emer-
gency service facilities, radio communication
is found to be more reliable. Financial institu-
tions abroad attempt unsuccessfully to com-
municate with business partners in Quito.
About half of the city is still without
electricity. The main transmission substa-
tions, Santa Rosa and La Vicentina,
were not seriously damaged, but the
northern distribution substations will
need major repairs before electricity
can be restored there. Some facili-
ties have backup power generators,
but are unable to use them because
of a lack of fuel.
The role of the military expands
to guarding homes and shops against
looters; recovering corpses; setting
up temporary hospitals and shel-
ters; and distributing food and wa-
ter. Claims for government assistance
increase, and people become angry
when their requests are met slowly, inad-
equately, or not at ail.
One Week Later
One week after the earthquake, collapsed
buildings-responsible for most of the
deaths-are still being searched for bodies.
Many people are still hoping that missing
relatives or friends will be found alive. Emer-
gency workers remove the remaining victims.
Undamaged public school buildings and other
temporary shelters are full, and many people
are living on the streets and in parks. Undam-
aged private schools resume classes.
Most businesses reopen. Food is scarce
and expensive. Some banks are not permit-
ting withdrawals because of damage to bank
computers; customers become angry, and
small, isolated disturbances erupt outside of
these banks. Products from northern Ecua-
dor, mainly milk and potatoes, are difficult to
deliver to Quito. Emergency supplies from the
international community, mostly food, cloth-
ing, medical supplies, and tents, continue to
arrive at the Quito and Latacunga airports.
Many donations do not fit local needs, and
supplies that cannot be used or easily distrib-
uted collect at the airports, burdening relief
agencies.
Garbage trucks still cannot reach many
parts of the city, and trash and human waste
collect in streets and alleys. Many residents
Eleetricalsubstation.
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develop gastrointestinal diseases as a result
of consuming contaminated food and water.
Health care in Quito's clinics and hospitals
improves after medicines and personnel ar-
rive from Latacunga, Ambato, and Guayaquil,
but hospitals still lack beds to accommodate
ail the injured and sick. Exacerbating the
problem, injured people arrive from neighbor-
ing towns such as Pamasqui, San Antonio,
and Nono in search of better health care
facilities.
Public transportation is improving ex-
cept in northern Quito, where many roads are
still closed. The southern roads remain the
only dependable access to Quito. Gasoline is
now available throughout the city.
Although the main water treatment plants
are now fully operable, numerous pipe rup-
tures within Quito keep water from being
widely distributed. Lack of water pipes slows
recovery. Damage to the open canal that
brings water to the Puengasi plant may take
more than a week to be repaired. Some water
is trucked in from outlying regions.
Most of the fallen electric poles have
been replaced. The city has electricity, with
the exception of parts of the Centro Historico
and the far northern areas. Phone service is
still unreliable. The sewage system also sees
only minor repairs because of inundation with
rainwater and human waste, lack of equip-
ment, and a Iimited quantity of spare pipes.
Many utilities still wait for key equipment and
spare parts, not available locally, preventing
complete recovery.
Those who fled the city the first few days
after the earthquake begin to return. Resi-
dents of Quito start to adjust to their new way
of life. They make plans to restore their dam-
aged homes and businesses, although no
one knows from where money for such efforts
will come.
One Month Later
One month after the earthquake, panic
has subsided, and residents no longer fear
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Water treatmentplant above the Centro Historico.
aftershocks. Most residences remain dam-
aged, and virtually none of the collapsed
buildings are being rebuilt. Shelters are still
full, and many people are still living in small
tent cities in plazas, parks, and playing fields.
For many, the only improvement they have
seen in their living condition is that the plas-
tic, cardboard, or plywood tents they built
themselves have now been replaced with
canvas tents provided by international agen-
cîes. Health officiais are concerned about a
significant rise in respiratory ailments result-
ing from the large numbers of people living in
crowded temporary quarters.
Residents of Quito have started plan-
ning and seeking assistance for reconstruct-
ing damaged or destroyed homes. Businesses
are open, and the banks accept deposits and
permit withdrawals. Most children are back in
school, many in hastily constructed, tempo-
rary classrooms. Distribution centers are es-
tablished to deliver food and supplies coming
from abroad.
Tourism has ceased, adding to overall
economic losses; foreigners watch Quito's
earthquake recovery and make plans accord-
ingly. Businesses have suffered considerable
losses, and some will never recover. For the
minority with insurance, their claims remain
unaddressed as the extent of damage to
many buildings has not yet been evaluated.
Forthe time being, some business owners are
given provisional payment until more accurate
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damage estimates can be determined and
reinsurers can respond. Insurance compa-
nies are having problems converting their
assets into cash, and some are likely to go
bankrupt. Many businesses will receive insuf-
ficient reimbursement due to inadequate poli-
cies and lack of insurance company reserves
and reinsurance.
Water service has been restored to most
parts of Quito; the use of trucked water and
water conservation are now a way of life in
areas where it has not been restored. In areas
where damage was particularly heavy, it will
take two months or more to restore regular
service.
The roads are clear of rubble, although
in the Centro Historico some are blocked by
wood poles used to support damaged build-
ings, especially churches. Collapsed over-
passes have not been rebuilt, but the debris
has been removed and alternate routes es-
tablished. Temporary bridges are being built
by the army.
Repairs to electrical substations in the
north are still not complete, although substa-
tions in other parts of Quito have been re-
paired. Reduced system performance
continues for several months due to transmis-
sion line damage in the western portion of
Quito. Telephone service is still intermittent,
and loss of convenient international commu-
nication severely disrupts national and inter-
national commerce.
School buildings.
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Because of minimal repair capacity and
the slow and difficult work of visually detect-
ing sewer ruptures, officiais estimate that the
sewage system will not be fully operational for
some five months. Funding for repairs is
scarce since the system is uninsured. Col-
lapse and blockage of major sewer tunnels
cause extensive, long-term limitations in sewer
use in parts of Quito. Contingency plans are
established to clean sewage from streets and
dig pits throughout the city, which will serve
as interim dumps.
Officiais start defining reconstruction
plans for the city. Recovery assistance for
individual citizens is insufficient, as most
property owners do not have earthquake in-
surance. National agencies, such as the Na-
tional Bank for Development and the Housing
Ministry, do not have enough funds to help
victims. Questions and complaints are raised
as to how the available funds are being used.
Adobe buildings damaged in the March
1987earthquake.
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Thepreœdingdescn'ption il/u.stml'es
sorne of the possible Impacts on Quito
jrom orœpart/cula,. artbquake inQu Ito.
Otbereat"thqllakes notevaluatedin this
study will result in diJJerent conse-
quences. This de crlption is intended
on/y/or use in planning andprepared-
ness p"ograms andJor raislng aware-
ness oft!:Je eat'thquake risk.
An earthquake could strike Quito in
the future and produce effects such as those
just described. As Quito is the seat of
Ecuador's national government and the
source of one-third of the gross national
product, the effects would be felt across
Ecuador. Municipal, regional, and national
government functions would be disrupted.
The city's commercial, banking, and insur-
ance industries would take years to recover.
Human casualties would be substantial.
There are steps, however, that Quito
can take now to prepare for its next major
earthquake-steps to reduce loss of life,
damage to property, harm to the economy,
disruption to government services, and dam-
age to cultural heritage. Sorne of these steps
are presented in the next section, "Managing
Quito's Earthquake Risk."
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Managing Quito's
Earthquake Risk
L the third phase of the project, a group of
international and Ecuadorian specialists from
business and industry, city government,
urban planning, emergency services, and
infrastructure developed specific recommen-
dations within thei.r fields of expertise for
managing earthquake risk in Quito. Their
recommendations were based on the tech-
nical analysis of this project, their knowl-
edge of Quito, and their experience with
programs that have been successful in
other earthquake-threatened cities. Their
work was performed dllring a two-day work-
shop in July of 1993. The names of the
participants are Iisted at the beginning ofthis
report.
The recommendations are broad in
scope. They include creating a Quito Earth-
quake Safety Advisory Board; addressing
the vulnerability of buildings, infrastmcture,
and emergency response eqllipment and
facilities; developing gllidelines for safe
construction; improving emergency plan-
ning and preparing disaster recovery plans;
and furthering social and scien tific research.
Many recommendations are short-term and
can be implemented within two to four
years. SlIch measures include developing a
A view ofQuito, looking northeastfrom Panecillo Hill.
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comprehensive building code to help en-
sure that new faciIities can withstand earth-
quake shaking; designing and practicing
emergency response disaster contingency
plans; and teaching the public about earth-
quake safety and emergency preparedness.
Other recommendations are long-term, and
may require decades to complete. These
tend to be more expensive, and include
strengthening existing buildings and infra-
structure and improving emergency ser-
vice faciIities such as hospitals and the fire
department.
The earthquake risk management rec-
ommendations, described in full in the re-
port The Quito, Ecuador, Earthquake Risk
ManagementProject: A Compilation OfMeth-
ods, Data, and Findings, can be used as a
starting point in designing an earthquake
risk management program for Quito. Until
such a program can be initiated, however,
there are six projects that are of highest
priority and deserve immediate attention.
They are:
1. Creoflng CI Quito Eartbquake {~rety
Adolsory Board. Implementation of
earthquake risk management programs
requires leadership, commitment, and
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ongoing oversight by government offi-
ciaIs and community leaders. Efforts must
be coordinated among government agen-
cies at every level, schools, businesses,
fmancial institutions, and other entities
concerned with the city's future eco-
nomic health and the welfare of its citi-
zens. Such coordination and continuing
progress toward earthquake safety goals
require designation of primary responsi-
biJity and the formation of an oversight
council or board.
Under this project, the Office of the
Mayor of Quito would appoint a special
assistant to the mayor, who would report
directly to the mayor and be responsible
for the earthquake safety program. The
special assistant would serve as the
mayor's liaison to the Earthquake Safety
Advisory Board and as its executive direc-
tor. The mayor's office would define the
purpose and authority of the board, crite-
ria for selecting members, and bylaws to
govern the board's activities. The mayor
would issue a resolution creating the
board and appointing its members to
represent business, emergency services,
government, and the scientific and engi-
neering communities.
Taking Steps Toward Earthquake Preparedness
Rccommendations for Improving QlIitO'S Earthqllake Safety
1. Create a Quito Earthquake Safety Advisory Board.
2. Adopt and enforce an effective building code.
3. Support scientific research to further evaluate Quito's
earthquake risk.
4. Develop a workplace earthquake preparedness program.
5. Improve emergency response equipment and facilities.
6. Establish a proper insurance tariff with underwriting
guidelines.
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Centro Historico.
The Earthquake Safety Advisory Board
would advise the mayor, local govern-
ment agencies, and private industry on
earthquake preparedness and risk man-
agement issues. It would also be respon-
sible for setting mitigation priorities based
on the earthquake threat; developing and
administering an earthquake risk man-
agement program; monitoring and regu-
larIy updating the earthquake risk
management program; advocating the
incorporation of mitigation measures into
the urban development process; and
seeking local and international funding
for mitigation projects.
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_. AdojJlillf:!, and e'~/orcing (/Il effectiue
bllilding code. An effective building code
helps to ensure that new facilities are
designed and constructed ta withstand
earthquake shaking. Under this project, a
committee of engineers and planners
would design a building code for aIl
structural types in Quito, facilitate the
code's integration into design and con-
struction, and regularly update the code.
The code couId also provide the basis for
future retrofit of critical structures. En-
forcement is achieved by establishing a
committee to educate builders, planners,
and engineers about the building code;
determining an efficient method for en-
forcing it; and training inspectars to evalu-
ate building design and construction.
3. lljJporUng sc/eni/fic research to fu/"-
tber ella/llale Qulto's eart/.lqllake ,-isR.
The Quito Earthquake Risk Management
Project was restricted to the analysis of
available data during an lS-month pe-
riod. Hence, many assumptions were
made in the development of the potential
earthquakes and their effects. Further
research is necessary to expand the soil
profile data base to obtain a more de-
tailed zonation of the city; map the depth
and location of the bedrock to improve
estimations of soil amplification; identi.fy
active fauIts and determine their geom-
etries and mechanisms to better estimate
potential magnitudes and locations of
earthquakes; instaIl instruments to mea-
sure epicenters, ground shaking, and re-
sponse of buildings during earthquakes;
develop improved procedures for esti-
mating earthquake damage to structures
in Ecuador; and develop a scenario for
the greater Quito area and for other
potential earthquakes. Such research will
improve the technical base for a more
accurate earthquake scenario, better meth-
ods of earthquake risk management, and
improved earthquake codes and policies.
4. DtwelojJlng a U/orkplace earthquake
pre/Jaredlless pJ'ogram. Educating
employees in earthquake risks and emer-
gency preparedness, and the spread of
this information to friends and family,
would benefit individual businesses,
employees, and the community at large.
Under this project, ALERTA, Quito's
private-sector disaster preparedness pro-
gram, and various emergency service
organizations wouId train business man-
agement to analyze the earthquake risks
that they face, and to develop risk man-
agement plans for their institutions. Em-
ployees at every level would then be
educated in preparing for and surviving
an earthquake.
5.IlJ1provlng emergency response
equlpment and jacilitie. Improved
emergency response equipment and fa-
cilities are vital for quick, effective re-
sponse to a major earthquake. Under this
project, research teams would inventory
available human and material resources,
and, based on a disaster scenario, deter-
mine vulnerabilities and critical needs.
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derwriting guidelines would be based on
soil properties, estimated ground shaking
intensities and subsequent geological haz-
ards, damage distribution estimates, and
structural design and construction. Rating
discounts would then be available for
structures with appropriate earthquake-
resistant design and construction.
More detailed descriptions of these
projects are included in the Appendices.
Practical steps can be taken now that
would significantly reduce the physical,
social, and economic consequences ofearth-
quakes to Quito, as the preceding projects
illustrate. However, managing earthquake
risk is a process that requires time, sustained
effort, and direction, aH of which require
that government officiaIs, business leaders,
and the public be convinced that earth-
quake safety is important relative to the
other needs of the community. With direc-
tion, leadership, and the support of the
community, Quito has the opportunity to
prepare its citizens, buildings, and economy
for the next major earthquake.
6: ESlalJlisblng a
proj)er il/surance
tariff wilb under-
lt rlling g uirlelines.
A proper insurance
tariffwith underwrit-
ing guidelines con-
sidering earthquake
hazards would en-
courage responsible,
earthquake-resistant
design and construc-
tion, and would make
earthquake insurance
available to residents
of Quito. The insur-
ance tariff and un-
Ti/e roofand adobe eupola in the Centra Historieo.
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Conclusions
T he Quito Earthquake Risk Manage-
ment Project has led to several significant
conclusions.
• Qllito, wbicb bas a 101lg hist01JI of
eflrlbquakes. will expet'ieltce dam-
agillg eat·thqllakes illlhefulure. Sorne
will be significantly stronger than the
March 1987 earthquake, and will result in
major damage to the city.
• Quito is Imp"epare(fJor il ... "e.~1 ma-
jm'eartI:Jquake, andIJecomes inCl'eas-
illgfy tlllll1erable ulitb lùn-e. Significant
loss of life, destmction of property, and
harm ta the economy will result unless
government, business, and community
leaders recognize and begin to address
the earthquake threat by taking steps ta
manage earthquake risk.
• teps lOti artl redllcillg Qui/o's VII 1-
Ilerabilit)' Lo destrllcUve earthquakes
sboufd be Lakell Immedialely. Quito
has the opportunity to prepare its citi-
zens, buildings, and economy for the
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next major earthquake, but significant
progress toward reducing the physical,
social, and economic consequences of
earthquakes ta Quito can only be achieved
with the support of the community and
from focused, sustained action by govem-
ment, business, and conununity leaders.
• Ali Eartbquake SaJel)1AdvisoryBoard
sbould he eslablished to deve/op,
implement, mOllitor, and regularly
IIpdate li comp,-ebensive earlhqllake
risk mallageme1tlprogramfOl"Quito.
The findings of the Quito Earthquake
Risk Management Project provide a start-
ing point for the work of this board.
Earthquakes will be a part of Quito's
future, as surely as they have been a part of
its past. While it is not known when the next
major carthquake will occur, efforts put
forth toward earthquake safety today will
result in less damage and death in the future.
This project is only a step toward Quito's
earthquake risk management. The next step
must be made by Quito's leaders and citizens.
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AppendixA
Organization, Chronology, and Accomplishments
Organization
The participants of the project feU into
one or more of four categories:
• An Ecuadorian-international Working
Group (WG), consisting of specialists in
geology, seismology, structural engineer-
ing, soils engineering, urban planning,
and data management. Ali scientific, en-
gineering, and planning work was per-
formed by WG.
• The Technical Advisory Committee (TAC),
consisting of international experts in the
fields of structural engineering, soiJs en-
gineering, geology, seismology, urban
planning, emergency response, and data
management. The TAC provided WG
with technical recommendations on how
earthquake risk assessments have been
made in other cities, as weIl as advice on
what mitigation actions may be useful in
Quito. The TAC reviewed the project for
technical accuracy and provided links with
international science and engineering
communities and professional organiza-
tions .
• The Social and Economie Advisory Com-
mittee (SEAC), consisting of international
and Ecuadorian representatives from the
banking and insurance industry, public
health, utilities, construction, emergency
response, and urban development. The
SEAC contributed overall guidance and
advice on long-term project planning,
and provided links with international
agencies and businesses concerned with
managing earthquake risk. Project priori-
ties were set by the Ecuadorian members
of the SEAC.
• GeoHazards International coordinated the
activities ofWG, the TAC, and the SEAC.
The members ofthese groups are listed
at the beginning of this report.
Technical advisors tour
Quito, October 1992.
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Chronology
DATE
]uly 25, 1992
September 16-17,1992
October 1992
October 26-27, 1992
November 1992-April 1993
]anuary 11-15, 1993
March 1993
May 27-28, 1993
May-]uly 1993
]uly 14-15, 1993
]uly 15, 1993
]uly-September 1993
October 10,1993
November 1993
]anuary 1994
March 3,1994
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ACTIVITY
International meeting ofsome members ofWG, TAC, and SEAC
at Tenth World Conference on Earthquake Engineering in Madrid
ta introduce project and receive initial advice
SEAC meets to establish project guidelines
WG drafts work plan
TAC and WG review work plan, discuss data, and propose
methodology
WG performs technical work; Ecuadorian soils engineer visits
University of British Columbia, and University of British Colum-
bia structural engineer visits Quito
Four Ecuadorian members of SEAC tour California government
agencies and corporations having exemplary earthquake risk
management programs
ALERTA, a private-sector disaster preparedness council, is cre-
ated following the model of los Angeles' BICEPP
TAC, WG, and Ecuadorian members of SEAC meet to review
progress
WG refines hazard assessment and interviews operators of
Quito's infrastructure to evaluate vulnerability
Members ofWG, TAC, SEAC, and selected experts participate in
workshop to describe Quito's earthquake vulnerability and draft
recommended mitigation actions
ALERTA hears presentations by members of los Angeles' BICEPP
and California's Seismic Safety Commission
WG writes first draft of final technical report and sends to TAC
for review
TAC and WG meet to review draft of final report
World Conference of Building OfficiaIs initiates project to
translate and adopt U.S. building codes for Ecuador
WG and GeoHazards International submit report to mayor of
Quito
Mayor of Quito makes public presentation of the findings of the
project
The Quito Earthquake Risk Management Project
Accomplishments
The project accomplished the
foUowing in regard to its objectives:
Toward improving the understanding
of Quito's earthquake hazard, the project
resulted in:
• A comprehensive but preliminary estima-
tion of the consequences of potential
earthquakes on Quito.
• A survey of Quito's urban infrastructure,
with emphasis on its vlIlnerability to
earthquakes.
• The initiation of a review by EClladorian
insurance companies of their exposure in
the event of a damaging earthquake.
Toward ralSll1g the awareness of the
earthquake risk within Ecuador and interna-
tionally, the project resulted in:
• The publication of three technical papers
about Quito's risk management measures
at international conferences in San Fran-
cisco, Califomia; Wellington, New Zealand;
and Montreal, Canada.
• Nine workshops in Quito, in which for
the first time more than 100 Ecuadorian
and international specialists, including
the Mayor of Quito and other officiaIs,
conferred about Quito's earthquake his-
tory, hazard, and risk.
Emergency re~ponseworkinggroup ofthe Earthquake Risk Management Workshop,july 1993.
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• An international tour, in which
four Ecuadorian government
officiais and business leaders
visited 12 California govern-
ment agencies and businesses
that are specialists in earth-
quake preparedness.
• The attendance of two rep-
resentatives of the mayor's
office at the Metropolis Con-
ference, a meeting of officiais
from the world's largest cities,
in Montreal, Canada.
Plenary meeting of the Earthquake Risk Management
Workshop,july 1993.• The attendance of three Ecua-
dorian scientists and engineers
at the Tenth World Conference on Earth-
quake Engineering in Madrid, Spain, and
at a NATO-US AIO sponsored Advanced
Research Workshop in Istanbul, Turkey.
• Two l-week technical exchange VISltS,
one by an Ecuadorian engineer to a
Canadian University, and one by a Cana-
dian engineer to the Escuela Politécnica
Nacional in Quito.
• The publication and distribution of the
products of this report to a broad audience.
And toward designing self-sustaining
programs to manage Quito's earthquake
risk, the project resulted in:
• A framework-reviewed by international
technical, government, and business
specialists-of a comprehensive, multi-
28
year program ta manage Quita's earth-
quake risk.
• ALERTA, a private-sector disaster pre-
paredness council to foster earthquake
risk management, following the model of
Los Angeles' Business and Industry Coun-
cil for Emergency Planning and Prepared-
ness (BICEPP).
• The capability of the Escuela Politécnica
Nacional and the Municipio de Quito to
create new earthquake damage estimates
for other earthquakes, and the ability to
obtain new data on soils and structural
response.
• The World Conference of Building Offi-
ciais initiating a project ta translate and
adopt U.S. building codes for Ecuador.
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Appendix B
Priority Earthquake Risk Management Projects
Establish an Earthquake Safety
Advisory Board
Implementation ofearthquake risk man-
agement programs requires leadership, com-
mitment, and ongoing oversight by
government officiaIs and community lead-
ers. Efforts must be coordinated among
government agencies, schools, businesses,
financial institutions, and other entities con-
cernedwith the city's future economic health
and welfare of its citizens. Such coordina-
tion and continuing progress toward earth-
quake safety goals require designation of
primary responsibility and the formation of
an oversight council or board.
Under this project, the Office of the
Mayor of Quito would appoint a special
assistant to the mayor, who would report
directly to the mayor and be responsible for
the earthquake safety program. The special
assistant would serve as the mayor's liaison
to the Earthquake Safety Advisory Board
and as its executive director. The mayor's
office would define the purpose and author-
ity of the board, criteria for selecting mem-
bers, and bylaws to govern the board's
activities. The mayor would issue a resolu-
tion creating the board and appointing its
members to represent business, emergency
services, government, and the scientific and
engineering communities.
The Earthquake Safety Advisory Board
would advise the mayor, local government
agencies, and private industry on earth-
quake preparedness and risk management
issues. It would also be responsible for
setting mitigation priorities based on the
earthquake threat; developing and adminis-
tering an earthquake risk management pro-
gram; monitoring and regularly updating
the earthquake risk management program;
advocating the incorporation of mitigation
measures into the urban development pro-
cess; and seeking local and international
funding for mitigation projects.
Responsible Agencies:
• The Mayor of Quito
• The Office of the Mayor
Adopt and Enforce an Effective
Building Code
An effective building code helps to
ensure that new facilities are designed and
constructed to withstand earthquake shak-
ing. Under this project, a committee of
engineers and planners would design a
building code for aIl structural types in
Quito, facilitate the code's integration into
design and construction, and regularly up-
date the code. Enforcement is achieved by
establishing a committee to educate builders,
planners, and engineers about the building
code; determining an efficient method for
enforcing it; and training inspectors to evalu-
ate building design and construction.
Auxiliary Tasks:
• Adopt stricter building codes for the de-
sign and construction of emergency ser-
vice and critical facilities buildings
including hospitals, fire stations, police
stations, Civil Defense buildings, public
buildings, and emergency shelters.
• Establish standards for retrofit of critical
structures.
• Publish and distribute guidelines for the de-
sign of self-built structures for use by indi-
viduals constructing their own dwellings.
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• Organize training courses for profession-
aIs on seismic design and construction of
new buildings. Adapt procedures already
developed in other countries.
• Include in each building loan agreement
a contract to ensure that borrowers abide
by building codes.
Possible Resources:
Building codes from global cities pre-
clude the need for Quito to develop an
entirely new code. An existing model, such
as the Uniform Building Code (UBC) of the
United States, provides a comprehensive
framework into which Quito can incorpo-
rate appropriate seismic parameters, struc-
tural types, methods of construction, and
properties of building materials. Local and
international organizations, such as Escuela
Politécnica Nacional and other universities,
Consejo Nacional de Desarrollo, Consejo
Nacional de Universidades, the Structural
Engineers Association of California, the Ap-
plied Technology Council of California, the
Seismic Safety Commission of California, the
International Conference of Building Offi-
ciaIs, and the World Organization of Build-
ing OfficiaIs, may be valuable in helping to
develop a code.
Responsible Agencies:
• Sociedad Ecuatoriana de Ingenieria
Estructural
• Camara de la Construccion de Quito
• Municipio de Quito
• Instituto Ecuatoriano de Normalizacion
Support Scientific Research to
Improve Earthquake Scenarios
The hazard assessment of the Quito
Earthquake Risk Management Project was.
based only on available data. As a conse-
quence, several assumptions were made
about depth to bedrock under Quito, at-
tenuation relations, response of soils, and
response of typical structures. Further re-
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search will improve earthquake hazard as-
sessments, methods of earthquake risk man-
agement, and earthquake codes and policies.
Specifically, the following studies will im-
prove knowledge of Quito's earthquake
risk:
1. Expand the soil profile data base.
Increase the number and depth of soil
profiles to obtain a more detailed soil
zonation of the city.
2. Map the bedrock. Map the depth and
location of the bedrock to improve esti-
mations of soil amplification.
3. Map active faults. To better estimate
potential magnitudes and locations of
earthquakes and to assess seismic poten-
tial, identify active fauIts and determine
their geometries and mechanisms.
4. Install instruments to locate earth-
quakes, measuregroundshaking, and
evaluate response of buildings dur-
ing earthquakes. InstaIl and maintain
state-of-the-art seismometers around
Quito to measure and locate earthquakes,
and strong-motion accelerometers in
various buildings and in various soil zones
to increase knowledge of site effects and
specifie dynamic characteristics of repre-
sentative structures.
5. Develop improved procedures for
estimating earthquake damage to
structures in Ecuador. Many methods
used throughout the world for estimating
earthquake damage are from the United
States or ]apan, and therefore they do not
always account for specifie characteristics
of other regions. Damage matrices, used
in such estimations, that are specifie to
Ecuador should be developed to improve
future earthquake risk assessments.
6. Develop a scenario for the greater
Quito area and for other potential
earthquakes. Develop an earthquake
scenario for greater Quito and for other
potential earthquakes in order to incorpo-
rate seismic safety into future planning
and development of the city. Future sce-
narios should include improved methods
of estimating earthquake casualties and
deaths for the purpose of emergency
service response planning.
Possible Resources:
Possible sources of funding for this
project include international agencies such
as the United Nations Department of Ru-
manitarian Affairs, US and Canadian AID,
Banco Interamericano de DesarroIlo, ]ICA,
and ORSTOM; and private organizations
and foundations, banks, insurance compa-
nies, and the industrial sector. Resources
include graduate students, visiting experts,
and the international community.
Responsible Agencies:
• Instituto Geofisico of Escuela Politécnica
Nacional and other schools of engineer-
ing and geology
• Professional societies and unions (such
as SEIE)
Develop a Workplace
Earthquake Preparedness
Program
This project educates personnel in aIl
sectors of industry about earthquake risks
and emergency preparedness. This would
result in the spread of information to friends
and family as weIl, thereby benefiting not
only individual businesses and employees
but the community at large. Under this
project, management would first be trained
to analyze the earthquake risks they face
and develop risk management plans for
their institutions. The Superintendencia de
Bancos y Seguros, the Câmara de Industria,
and other relevant organizations would re-
quire management to submit educationplans.
Employees at every level would then be
educated in preparing for and surviving an
earthquake.
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Auxiliary Tasks:
• Rold industry-wide meetings to deter-
mine methods of increasing risk aware-
ness and to emphasize the opportunity
of managing these risks through policy
measures.
Possible Resources:
Courses on earthquake risk and emer-
gency preparedness may be available
through or developed by the Red Cross, the
fire department, ALERTA, and the Office of
Civil Defense. Useful references include
BICEPP (Los Angeles' Business and Industry
Council for Emergency Planning and Pre-
paredness) and the California Seismic Safety
Commission publications. Private industry
is an important source of funding for this
project.
Responsible Agencies:
• Management of respective institutions
• ALERTA
• Superintendencia de Bancos y Seguros,
Ministerio de Industria, and other rel-
evant organizations
Improve Emergency Response
Equipment and Facilities
Improved emergency response equip-
ment and facilities are vital for quick, effec-
tive response to a major earthquake. Under
this project, research teams would inven-
tory available human and material re-
sources, and based on a disaster scenario,
determine vulnerabilities and critical needs.
Priority should be given to fire-fighting
equipment, search and rescue equipment,
and hospitals.
Auxiliary Tasks:
• Work with the fire department and
Empresa Municipal de Agua Potable to
regularly inspect and repair fire hydrants.
• Secure funds to purchase a crane for use
in repairing and replacing damaged main
sewage collectors.
31
The Quito Earthquake Risk Management Project
• Provide institutions, private businesses,
industries, and social and public services
with basic emergency equipment, such as
first aid kits and emergency food and
water reserves.
• Improve training of search and rescue
teams.
Responsible Agencies:
• ReIevant emergency services organizations
• Municipio de Quito
• Direcci6nes de Planeamiento de la
Seguridad para eI Desarrollo Nacional
Establish a Proper Insurance
Tariff with Underwriting
Guidelines
A proper insurance tariff with insur-
ance underwriting guidelines considering
earthquake hazards would encourage re-
sponsible, earthquake-resistant design and
construction. Under this project, the Super-
intendencia de Bancos y Seguros, in collab-
oration with Asociaci6n de Compafiias de
Seguros dei Ecuador, Asociaci6n Nacional
de Agencias Colocadoras de Seguros dei
Ecuador, and international reinsurers, would
establish fair rating guidelines, which would
make earthquake insurance available to
residents of Quito. The insurance tariff and
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underwriting guidelines would be based on
soil properties, estimated ground shaking
intensities and subsequent geological haz-
ards, damage distribution estimates, and
structural design and construction. Rating
discounts would then be available for struc-
tures with appropriate earthquake-resistant
design and construction. A proper insur-
ance tariffand underwriting guidelines could
also ensure that earthquake insurance is
feasible for existing structures, especially
residential buildings.
Auxiliary Tasks:
• Evaluate sufficiency of client earthquake
coverage.
• Train insurance company staff to advise
clients on earthquake risk management
actions.
• Train insurance company staff to monitor
clients' adherence to the building codes.
Possible Resources:
Sources of information for this project
include the system oftariffs used in Mexico,
and CRESTA, the internationalworking group
of insurance and reinsurance companies.
Responsible Agencies:
• Superintendencia de Bancos y Seguros
• Asociaci6n de Compafiias de Seguros deI
Ecuador
• Asociaci6n Nacional de Agencias
Colocadoras de Seguros dei Ecuador
• Reinsurers
• Insurance companies, agents, and brokers
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AppendixC
Acronyms and Translations
Acronyms
ACOSE
ANACSE
ATC
BICEPP
CAMECO
CDMG
CENAPRED
CODIGEM
CONADE
EEQ
EMA
EMAP
EMETEL
IASPEI
IDNDR
IFC
IFEA
INECEL
]ICA
NATO
OLADE
ORSTOM
SEAC
SEIE
TAC
UNDRO
UNESCO
US AlD
VPI
WG
Asociacion de Compaîiias de Seguros del Ecuador
Asociacion Nacional de Agencias Colocadoras de Seguros del Ecuador
Applied Technology Council (USA)
Business and Industry Council for Emergency Planning and Preparedness
(Los Angeles)
Câmara Ecuatoriana de la Construccion
Callfornia Division of Mines and Geology
Centro Nacional de Prevencion de Desastres (Mexico City)
Corporacion de Desarrollo Geologico Minero y Metalurgico (Quito)
Consejo Nacional de Desarrollo (Ecuador)
Empresa Eléctrica Quito
Empresa Municipal de Alcantarillado (Quito)
Empresa Municipal de Agua Potable (Quito)
Empresa Estatal de Telecomunicaciones (Quito)
International Association of Seismology and Physics of the Earth's Interior
International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction
International Finance Corporation (Washington, DC)
Institut Français d'Etudes Andines (Quito)
Instituto Ecuatoriano de Electrificacion
]apan International Cooperation Agency
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Organizacion Latinoamericana de Energia
Institut Français de Recherche Scientifique pour le Developpement en
Cooperation (France)
Social and Economie Advisory Committee
Sociedad Ecuatoriana de Ingenieria Estructural
Technical Advisory Committee
United Nations Disaster Relief Organization (Geneva)
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (Paris)
United States Agency for International Development
Virginia Polytechnic Institute
Working Group
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Translations
Asociaci6n de Bancos Privados del Ecuador
Asociaci6n de Compafiias de Seguros
del Ecuador
Asociaci6n Ecuatoriana de Radiodifusi6n
Asociaci6n Nacional de Agencias Colocadoras
de Seguros del Ecuador
Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo
Câmara de Industria
Câmara de Industriales de Pichincha
Câmara de la Construcci6n de Quito
Câmara Ecuatoriana de la Construcci6n
Centro Nacional de Prevenci6n de Desastres
Compafieros de las Américas
Consejo Nacional de Desarrollo
Consejo Nacional de Universidades
Corporaci6n de Desarrollo Geol6gico
Minero y Metalurgico
Cuerpo de Bomberos de Quito
Defensa Civil
Direcci6n de Aviaci6n Civil, Aeropuerto
Direcci6n de Fiscalizaci6n Ilustre Municipio
de Quito
Direcci6n de Planitïcaci6n
Direcciones de Planeamiento de la Seguridad
para el Desarrollo Nacional
Direcci6n Nacional de Trânsito
Empresa Eléctrica Quito
Empresa Estatal de Telecomunicaciones
Empresa Municipal de Agua Potable
Empresa Municipal de Alcantarillado
Escuela Politécnica Nacional
Fondo de Salvamento
Fundaci6n Rescate
Ilustre Municipio de Quito
Instituto de Capacitaci6n Municipal
Instituto Ecuatoriano de Electrificaci6n
Instituto Ecuatoriano de Normalizaci6n
Instituto Geofisico
Ministerio de Industria
Ministerio de Salud Publica
Organizaci6n Latinoamericana de Energia
Sociedad Ecuatoriana de Ingenieria Estructural
Superintendencia de Bancos y Seguros
Unidad de Transporte nustre Municipio de Quito
Universidad Cat6lica de Quito
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Association of Private Banks of Ecuador
Association of Insurance Companies
of Ecuador
Ecuadorian Association of Broadcasting
National Association of Insurance Brokers
of Ecuador
Interamerican Development Bank
Chamber of Industry
Chamber of Industrialists of Pichincha
Chamber of Construction, Quito
Ecuadorian Chamber of Construction
National Center for Disaster Prevention
Partners of the Americas
National Development Council
National Council of Universities
Development Corporation of Geology,
Mines and Metallurgy
Quito Fire Brigade
Civil Defense
Administration of Civil Aviation, Airport
Municipal Administration of the Treasury,
Quito
Planning Department
Offices of Security Planning for
National Development
National Administration of Transit
Quito Electrical Company
State Telecommunications Company
Municipal Drinking Water Company
Municipal Sewer Company
National Polytechnic School
Salvation Fund
Rescue Foundation
Illustrious Municipality of Quito
Municipal Institute of Training
Ecuadorian Institute of Electricity
Ecuadorian Institute of Standardization
Geophysical Institute
Ministry of Industry
Ministry of Public Health
Latin American Energy Organization
Ecuadorian Structural Engineering Association
Superintendence of Banks and Insurance
Municipal Transportation Unit of Quito
Catholic University of Quito
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